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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND SOCIAL NORMS
Sterling D. Horne
Robert P. Inman
In Chapter 1, I model a public official’s decision to choose corruption as a function of local
investigative reporting efforts by journalists, showing that the marginal effect of a decline in
investigative reporting on corruption convictions is ambiguous and depends on the current
level of reporting. I then use newspaper entry and exit to estimate the impact of reporting
on corruption convictions in U.S. states. I find evidence that journalism is a net deterrent for
state officials, but I find no evidence of an effect for federal or local officials. In Chapter 2, I
look at how social norms affect decisions pertaining to risk. I use a difference-in-differences
approach to estimate the impact that religious affiliation has on loan-to-value ratios in new
mortgages using county-level U.S. data. I find that increased levels of religious affiliation
are associated with decreased loan-to-value ratios, controlling for income, race, and loan
attributes.
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PREFACE
The topics presented in the following two chapters could be characterized as untraditional
within the field of economics. In Chapter 1, I look at the relationship between media and
corruption, focusing in particular on the power of newspapers and investigative reporting
to uncover corruption in government. In Chapter 2, I look at how the social norms put on
by religion and its traditionally conservative ideals impact borrowing behavior in the U.S.
mortgage market.
Corruption of course has broad implications for economic growth, particularly in developing
countries, where corrupt politicians and institutions can effectively choke whole economies
by sewing distrust and expropriating resources that might fuel productivity (Olken and
Pande, 2012). A lot has been said about what corruption can do to an economy. Less has
been said about what factors determine corruption itself. Given its importance in affecting
a wide range of economic outcomes, it is perhaps worth the effort to examine the incentives
that drive public officials to corruption in the first place.
The implications for effective change are much clearer if we understand the mechanism.
Better understanding the precise nature of the media’s role in combating corruption puts
us a step closer to determining the right prescription for governments plagued by it. While
a free press is touted as an effective remedy, we still don’t fully understand how effective
a free press is in reducing corruption. Past studies have focused on broad cross-country
comparisons and questionably reliable survey data to draw our best conclusions. That is
beginning to change with more recent studies looking at regionally specific datasets. This
dissertation uses a precise measurement of corruption convictions, localized in U.S. states
to minimize unobserved geographic heterogeneity, and estimates the impact of newspaper
entry and exit over time on convictions. More research of this sort will help us paint a
clear picture, and encourage better policy responses, whether they be in the form of laws
protecting the press or public funds devoted to institutions tasked with uprooting public
xi
corruption.
With regards to social norms and borrowing behavior, the importance of understanding the
incentives that drive people to take on very high levels of debt is in the implications for
borrowers in the face of a financial shock. The 2008 foreclosure crisis clarified this point.
Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) show that the primary determinant of foreclosure in the wake
of the housing crisis was not sub-prime status, but a loan-to-value ratio higher than one.
What accounts for the share of people willing to borrow at high initial loan-to-value ratios?
This is a question about what impacts consumer preferences and risk appetite.
My research suggests that religion plays a role. I show that religious adherence is associated
with lower risk-taking. I look at whether changes in religious adherence by county in the
U.S. were associated with changes in average loan-to-value ratios between 2000 and 2010.
This research was particularly pertinent in the wake of the 2009 foreclosure crisis, but it
remains relevant today. In particular, what it says about social norms and their ability to
incentivize risk-taking has the potential to influence society more broadly. It need not be
just religion that nudges people toward better financial decisions. Perhaps secular education
can play a similar role in shaping norms around risk early in life.
These chapters present economic research that is somewhat untraditional, but fundamen-
tally both chapters are about examining the decisions of individual economic agents and
the subtle incentives that govern those decisions, for good or ill. This research represents
a meaningful contribution to the literature, and a step to better understanding public cor-
ruption and social norms.
xii
CHAPTER 1 : INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC CORRUPTION
1.1. Introduction
In early 2018, a group of journalists in South Africa won the Taco Kuiper Award for
Investigative Journalism. They represented two news publications and one non-profit orga-
nization.1 The Taco Kuiper Award is a South African award given annually to investigative
journalists who have made a significant contribution to journalism. This year the award was
particularly meaningful. The journalists awarded had devoted themselves to investigating
and reporting on the Gupta brothers. These were cronies of President Jacob Zuma who
had been for years accused of corruption, and especially of granting political favors to the
Guptas and others close to himself. Despite his influence, however, Zuma couldn’t avoid
the South African media and the persistence of investigative journalists who spent years
investigating and reporting on his corrupt behavior starting well before his election in 2009.
On February 14, 2018, President Zuma resigned after nine years in power, effectively pushed
out by his own party. It was a major shift for the country and for the African National
Congress, and one that was long overdue. The story of Zuma’s fall is much more than a
story about corruption and the media’s effective reporting, but it is hard to ignore the role
that the media played. One wonders whether Zuma’s fate might have been different had
the press in South Africa not had the freedom that they do.
South Africa is hardly alone. The past winners and finalists of the Pulitzer Prize in Inves-
tigative Reporting include a piece from the Tennessean about a congressman’s “financial
dealings, which revealed flagrant abuses and caused the U.S. Justice Department to re-open
an investigation of the matter.”2 Another by the Providence Journal-Bulletin “disclosed
pervasive corruption within the Rhode Island court system.” Investigative Reporters and
Editors, a nonprofit organization and forum for journalists globally, boasts a catalogue of
1Two online news publications were involved, News24 and the Daily Maverick, as well as the non-profit
amaBhungame.
2http://www.pulitzer.org/prize-winners-by-category/206
1
some 27,000 investigative pieces published since 1975. These stories represent substantial
undertakings for the reporters involved, often requiring months of digging through public
documents, interviewing, writing, fact-checking, and editing. And the subject matter is
highly diverse. The IRE lists investigative pieces covering a wide range of topics, includ-
ing campaign finance, charitable organizations, college sports, the criminal justice system,
healthcare and pharmaceuticals, mortgage lending, immigration, paid lobbyists, the mili-
tary, sexual harassment, and, of course, public officials in government, just to name a few.
Newspapers have always been strongly represented among the purveyors of investigative
journalism, but many of these stories are done for radio, television, and online publications
as well. The freedom of the press that engenders this sort of vibrant culture of serious
journalism and investigative reporting is generally regarded as key to the enforcement of
corruption, acting to deter potentially bad actors while bringing the criminal and ethically
challenged to the court of public opinion and social justice.
But while media plays its role in corruption enforcement, it is hardly alone. Formalized
investigative agencies and a criminal justice system are the norm in the developed world,
and increasingly in emerging economies as well.3 In the U.S., the Department of Justice,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, local and state police departments, etc., are heavily
involved in the formal process of uncovering corruption and prosecuting the corrupt. We
might think of their roles as complementary to the media’s role in most respects, although
they may often be at odds given their differing incentives around the release of information
to the public. The relationship between the media and the criminal justice system raises
two questions.
The first is purely empirical—what impact does the media actually have on corruption? And
more specifically, does the media have any material impact on convictions? The question is
about the essential role that the media plays. Are they purely a purveyor of information,
or do they contribute materially to the investigative efforts that ultimately lead to criminal
3See Ferraz and Finan (2008) and Ferraz and Finan (2011)
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investigations? In as much as we care about corruption and its impact on economic activity
and social discord, we should work to understand the causal mechanisms behind it and
determine how best to enforce rules against it.
The second question follows directly–how do we shape public policy to effectively discourage
corruption? The media itself may be outside the scope of public policy action in the U.S.,
but clearly understanding its relationship to the criminal justice system, and especially the
formal investigative process, can inform our resource allocation decisions at local, state, and
federal levels. Making more information available to journalists, whether through Freedom
of Information Act requests, or otherwise, may be optimal to encourage journalism as an
enforcement mechanism and cost-effective substitute for formal investigations. Or perhaps
journalism functions primarily as a deterrent, and hence formal investigations ought to
receive the bulk of our attention. Research into the causes and consequences of corruption
have potentially wide reaching implications for policy.
This paper contributes to the empirical research on the causes of corruption, to provide a
starting point for thinking about the first question in particular, and to begin addressing
the policy implications. I proceed as follows. In section 1.2, I provide a review of the
relevant literature on corruption and the media. In section 1.3, I present a simplified static
model of the public official’s corruption decision and demonstrate that in the aggregate, the
relationship between investigative capacity and convictions is ambiguous. In section 1.4, I
review the data used to estimate the effect of newspapers on convictions. In section 1.5, I
cover the empirical strategy and identification. In section 1.6, I present the main results,
as well as some supplementary estimations for robustness. Finally, section 1.7 concludes.
1.2. Literature Review
Corruption has been extensively studied as it relates to developing economies, as these tend
to experience the highest levels of corruption across countries. Mauro (1995) typifies this
line of research, showing that countries with higher levels of corruption tend to exhibit lower
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levels of investment, which impacts long-term growth. Olken and Pande (2012) provide a
helpful summary of the key issues related to corruption in developing countries, its causes
and consequences, and the current state of research in the area. They make the point that
corruption appears to be far more prevalent in developing countries (although measurements
are highly heterogenous), and that it has far more prescient implications for the developing
world than the developed world. His point is well taken. The challenge, of course, with
studying corruption at the country level or within country in the developing world is that
data quality has historically been poor. There are recent exceptions to this, as I highlight
below, but it remains a significant hurdle for researchers. It’s for that reason that I look
specifically at U.S. corruption in a state-level analysis. The advantage with using variation
across U.S. states is that the federal corruption laws are consistent, official enforcement is
plausibly consistent, and yet states do tend to exhibit significant variation in conviction
levels.
I divide my summary of the literature into U.S. and non-U.S. research. I do this only
because this paper happens to be focused on corruption in the U.S., specifically. But some
of the more recent research on corruption in Brazil and Mexico is highly relevant to this
work as well, so I direct special attention to those in particular.
Literature on Corruption in the U.S.
Campante and Do (2012) look at corruption in U.S. states (as measured by convictions)
and find that isolated state capital cities have higher levels of corruption, and lower levels of
media coverage are part of the explanation. They use data available from the Department
of Justice’s Public Integrity Section. Their work builds on work by Glaeser and Saks (2006),
who use the same corruption data to investigate potential determinants of corruption across
U.S. states between 1976 and 2002. They find that average education levels and income are
inversely correlated with corruption convictions, but they don’t look specifically at media
as a potential determinant.
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Cordis and Warren (2014) use a quasi-natural experiment, exploiting differences in when
states enact and enforce strong Freedom of Information Act laws, to establish a causal
link between government openness and convictions. Their work is of particular relevance
to this paper as they look specifically at the link between open information policies and
convictions, and they attempt to distinguish between the impact that media can have on
convictions themselves from the impact that it has on overall corruption. Their findings
suggest that FOIA laws both reduce corruption and increase the probability that corruption
is detected, which they parse out by separating the short-run impact of FOIA laws on in-
creasing convictions from the longer-run reduction in convictions. Cordis and Milyo (2013)
is the first paper I am aware of that makes use of a relatively novel dataset on historical
U.S. corruption convictions. Prior work weighed heavily on data released by the Depart-
ment of Justice’s Public Integrity Section (PIN), which suffers from internal inconsistencies
and opaque reporting. The newer dataset, available from TRAC, provides case-level data
sourced directly from the Department of Justice’s internal record keeping databases. I cover
these data further in the Data section and further yet in the Appendix.
Literature on Global Corruption
Brunetti and Weder (2003) use international survey data to estimate the relationship be-
tween a free press and qualitatively measured corruption levels, showing that freedom of
the press is highly correlated with lower levels of corruption. They provide some com-
pelling evidence that the link is indeed causal, but the results rely heavily on survey data,
which are inherently difficult to interpret and potentially more representative of general
perceptions than underlying realities. However, their work is the first that directly engages
with corruption and media, and is an important initial contribution to the now growing
literature.
Adserà et al. (2003) show that corruption is lower and quality of governance higher in
countries with higher daily newspaper readership. They use data from the Political Risk
Services Group on corruption, bureaucratic quality, rule of law, etc., where each measure
5
combines qualitative and quantitative inputs within very specific categories to generate
more consistent measures in the cross section and over time.
Ferraz and Finan (2008), Ferraz and Finan (2011), and Avis et al. (2016) use some novel
data on Brazil’s anticorruption program to precisely estimate some of the causes and effects
of public corruption in Brazil. These papers exploit a program that Brazil started in 2003 in
which the federal government began auditing the expenditures of municipalities at random
and releasing the results to the public. Ferraz and Finan (2008) exploit the randomness of
the audits to estimate the likelihood of an incumbent politician being reelected if an audit
revealed some corrupt spending behavior. They find that the release of the audits has a
significant impact on election performance, and that in municipalities with local radio the
effect is magnified. In Ferraz and Finan (2011) the authors then use the results of the
audits to construct a measure of corruption in municipalities and show that institutions
play a key role in mitigating corruption. They find lower corruption levels in municipalities
where mayors can run for reelection, and they find that public access to information (i.e.,
local media) plays a key role in reducing corruption. Finally, Avis et al. (2016) use data
on multiple years of audits, in which some municipalities (but not all) are audited multiple
times, to estimate the deterrence effect a local audit has on future corruption levels. They
also find that neighboring municipalities with local media are more likely to experience the
same deterrence effect even without their own history of audits. These findings strongly
suggest that media is a deterrent to corruption, but the focus in these papers is on formal
auditing rather than investigative journalism as the primary mechanism for investigating
corruption.
Larreguy et al. (2014) confirm the results of Ferraz and Finan (2008) with a similar study
using auditing data on Mexican municipalities. They also look specifically at local radio
and television stations and estimate that each additional station in the municipality of
a mayor already shown to be corrupt, reduces the vote share of the incumbent party by
half a percentage point, or higher, depending on the nature of the malfeasance. However,
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they find no evidence that media outside of a specific municipality has any impact on vote
shares within the municipality, suggesting that media has a highly localized effect. This is
an important result for the literature on media and corruption, as it’s the first to exploit
exogenous variation in local media coverage to more precisely estimate the impact that local
media has on corruption in terms of electoral outcomes.
1.3. Model
The objective of this paper is to estimate the impact of investigative reporting on corrup-
tion. Since I lack a clean measure of investigative reporting, and since the ebb and flow
in an investigative journalist’s reporting may be endogenously determined by the level of
corruption anyway, I substitute investigative reporting with newspaper entry and exit. And
since I don’t directly observe corruption, I instead use convictions, which are clearly related
to corruption in meaningful ways, but are not necessarily a direct reflection of corruption
either. The subtle differences between the observed convictions and the underlying levels
of corruption demand further exploration, which I’ll provide in this section.
First, I define the corruption level in a static framework to be C. C measures the share
of all public officials who have engaged in corruption. C is unobservable. ρ is the share of
corrupt public officials who are investigated and convicted on corruption charges. ρ is also
unobservable, but I assume it to be a continuous and monotonically increasing function of
investigative resources, x ≥ 0. Convictions (as a share of public officials) are then given by
Ĉ(x) = ρ(x)C. (1.1)
Assuming C is exogenously determined, Ĉ ′(x) > 0 for all x. The universe in which these
simplifying assumptions hold would be a highly convenient one for testing potential candi-
dates for x, and it would allow for identification of the detection effect that a change in x
has on convictions. Unfortunately we don’t expect C to be exogenous.
I model C, the level of corruption, as a function of the individual official’s corruption
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decision. I assume that each official observes x and ρ perfectly, as well as the costs S > 0
associated with corruption. The benefits B to corruption are randomly determined and
drawn from a smooth distribution defined by the cumulative density function F on a non-
negative support. Assume that officials face independent draws on an identical distribution,
and that we have a continuum of officials. A risk-neutral official chooses corruption if and
only if
− ρ(x)S + (1− ρ(x))B > 0 (1.2)
Equation 1.2 characterizes the tradeoff an official makes when faced with an opportunity
to gain from corruption. The benefit B is weighted against the potential cost S, where
the weighting is determined by the probability of conviction. From equation 1.2, we get
equation 1.3, the necessary condition on B given S and x.
B >
ρ(x)S
1− ρ(x)
(1.3)
Since B is a random variable drawn from a distribution defined by the cumulative density
function F , we can derive the probability P that a public official becomes corrupt as a
function of x and S.
P (x, S) = Prob
(
B >
ρ(x)S
1− ρ(x)
)
= 1− F
(
ρ(x)S
1− ρ(x)
)
(1.4)
Assuming F is continuously differentiable, it follows that
Px(x, S) = −S · f
(
ρ(x)S
1− ρ(x)
)
· ρ
′(x)
(1− ρ(x))2
< 0 ∀x > 0 (1.5)
With equation 1.5 we have the intuitive result that as investigative resources rise, the
probability of any given official engaging in corruption decreases, all else equal. Furthermore,
note that as the number of officials increases indefinitely, the share of officials who are
corrupt approaches P . We map this result onto the original relationship between convictions
8
and corruption in 1.1 and we have
Ĉ(x, S) = ρ(x)C(x, S) = ρ(x)P (x, S)
Now differentiating with respect to x yields
Ĉx(x, S) = ρ
′(x)P (x, S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pos.
+ ρ(x)Px(x, S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
neg.
(1.6)
Note that the first term on the right hand side of equation 1.6 is positive while the second
term is negative, rendering the net effect ambiguous without some additional assumptions.
The two terms have convenient interpretations. The first term is what I’ll call the detection
effect, and the second term I’ll call the deterrence effect.4 The detection effect accounts
for the increase in the share of convicted corrupt officials associated with an increase in
investigative capacity. The deterrence effect accounts for the decrease in the number of offi-
cials willing to engage in corruption because of an increase in the detection effect associated
with a rise in investigative capacity. These two effects counteract each other in a static
equilibrium, rendering identification of each effect separately infeasible without imposing
additional restrictions.
To illustrate the identification problem that arises from competing detection and deterrence
effects, I parameterize the model as follows. For ρ(x), I use a modified logistic function
centered at zero and trending toward 1:
ρ(x) =
1− e−x
1 + e−x
For the distribution F I use a log-normal distribution with µ = 0. I assume the costs to
corruption, if detected, are given by S = 1. I then consider two cases for σ to illustrate the
4Cordis and Warren (2014) call the detection effect the conviction effect and the deterrence effect the
corruption effect. They develop a simple dynamic model of corruption and argue that in the short-run, the
corruption (deterrence) effect is outweighed by the conviction (detection) effect.
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potential for ambiguity over the net effect of an increase in x on Ĉ. Figure 1 and 2 graph
the detection and deterrence effects for σ = 1 and σ = .25 as well as the levels of corruption
and convictions given x. The detection and deterrence effects here correspond with the first
and second terms in equation 1.6, except that I negate the second term, such that the net
effect is the difference between the plotted lines. The corruption level and the conviction
level are proportional to all officials.
The value of σ corresponds with the variation in B, the randomly determined benefit to
corruption. Note that I’ve set S, the costs to corruption conditional on conviction, equal to
1, which is also equal to the average benefit (µ = 0 equates to a mean of 1 on a log-normal
distribution). So on average, the benefit doesn’t exceed the realized cost.
As the investigative capacity x rises, the tradeoff between corruption and no corruption
becomes increasingly skewed towards no corruption. At the same time the marginal value
of increasing x diminishes. The figures show that marginal value clearly. For x = 4, an
increase in x is virtually meaningless. On the other hand, when x is very low, a small
increase in x goes a long way, and in both charts we see a significant detection effect for an
increase in x from near 0, while the deterrence effect is less meaningful.
The effect becomes much more interesting for moderate levels of x. At x = 1, the deterrence
effect dominates, meaning that an additional increase in investigative capacity has the net
effect of reducing convictions because it deters more than it detects.
Note that the size of the net effect is sensitive to the variability in B. We can think of the
low variability state of σ = .25 as a world in which most officials are confronted with similar
opportunities for corruption. In that case, for sufficiently low x, most officials will take
the risk, and any increases in x would then contribute strongly to detecting malfeasance.
But if x is sufficiently high, even a small increase could quickly deter most officials, since
most of them have similar opportunities for corruption. And with the low variability in
opportunity, the prevalence of corruption drops off fairly quickly as x increases. Those
10
Figure 1: Examples of Detection and Deterrence Effects (σ = 1)
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Figure 2: Examples of Detection and Deterrence Effects (σ = .25)
(a) Net Effect of an Increase in x
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
1.25
0 1 2 3 4 5
x
Detection Effect
Deterrence Effect
(b) Level of Corruption
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 1 2 3 4 5
x
Convicted Officials
Corrupt Officials
12
dynamics are similar in a world in which corruption opportunities vary more, as in the case
of σ = 1, but the same effects are spread out over a much wider range on x, meaning that
we’re more likely to see an effect on convictions as x changes.
This simple model illustrates how important unobservable features of the system might
impact empirical estimates. For instance, we can’t directly observe the distribution of
benefits to corruption, so we can’t a priori assume that an increase in investigative capacity
will increase or decrease corruption convictions. However, the fact that we do continue
to convict corrupt officials suggests that the state of the world is not one in which x is
sufficiently high to limit nearly all corruption. The question then is whether we’re in a net
deterrence world or a net detection world.
The model suggests that a net deterrence world is indicative of higher levels of x than a net
detection world. A priori, one might assume that the U.S. and other developed countries
exist in a net deterrence world, where freedom of speech is well-established and public
institutions are strong, but corruption nevertheless persists. Some developing nations with
weaker institutions and fewer protections on speech might exhibit a net detection effect.
The model, of course, oversimplifies. It’s static, it assumes equal punishments regardless of
the size of the crime, it assumes corruption opportunities are exogenously determined, and
it assumes that the probability of conviction is solely determined by investigative capacity.
However, the strength of the model is in its power to illustrate how unobservable dynamics
can impact estimates where convictions are used as the primary measure of corruption.
1.4. Data
This paper pulls from data on corruption, newspaper entry and exit, government employ-
ment, government finance, and private employment. I’ll briefly discuss each. The two that
present the greatest challenge for procurement are the corruption data and the newspaper
data. Those data are sourced from TRAC and Editor & Publisher, respectively. The gov-
ernment employment data is available from the U.S. Census, the government finance data
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is culled from the U.S. Census of Governments, and the private employment data draws on
the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Wage Data as well as the Census Bureau’s
County Business Patterns data.
TRAC
Prior to the work of Cordis and Milyo (2013) and Cordis and Warren (2014), the primary
sources used in U.S. corruption-related research were survey data and the PIN Report from
the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ. The PIN Report is a report to Congress, produced
annually by the DOJ, on corruption convictions of federal, state, and local officials across
U.S. districts. But as Cordis and Milyo (2016) point out, it is not an administrative record
of convictions, but is instead based on a survey of district attorneys and represents an
incomplete and potentially misleading accounting of corruption convictions in the United
States. Nevertheless, it has long been a key source for data on corruption. Some early work
by Meier and Holbrook (1992) makes use of the PIN data to examine which cultural and
institutional factors impact corruption. More recent research by Glaeser and Saks (2006)
makes use of the PIN data to study the causes and consequences of corruption more broadly.
Others have taken a different approach, including Boylan and Long (2003), who conduct a
survey of state house reporters to get a better sense for the level of corruption than the PIN
report might provide, given that measures of convictions don’t capture corruption that goes
undetected. In recent years, however, research on U.S. corruption has moved away from
surveys and the PIN report, in favor of a more complete administrative record of federal
criminal cases.
Cordis and Milyo (2016) have provided an exhaustive overview of the TRACfed data and
how it compares (favorably) to the PIN data, so I will limit my exposition of the data to
a general overview, and then I will discuss some of the specific adjustments that I make to
the data for the purposes of this paper. TRACfed is an arm of TRAC, the Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse, an organization dedicated to making available to the public
data on the U.S. criminal justice system. TRAC secures much of its data by Freedom of
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Information Act requests, and rather than relying primarily on surveys, as PIN has done,
TRAC pulls its data from the official database records of the Department of Justice. TRAC
makes these data available to the public for a nominal fee.5
The primary advantage of these data over PIN is that these are recorded at the case level,
with far more detail than PIN provides. For each case, we know when it was referred to the
DOJ, which department made the referral (e.g. the Federal Bureau of Investigation), when
and if charges were filed, what those chargers were (or rather, what the lead charge on the
case was), how and when the case was disposed of (e.g., guilty verdict, dismissal, etc.), and,
in some cases, what the penalty was. Where the PIN data provide an estimated aggregation
of all varieties of corrupt activity with little transparency about the case composition, the
TRACfed data provide remarkable transparency and allow the researcher to more carefully
construct a measure of corruption that conforms to his/her specific criteria. This turns
out to be important, as Cordis and Milyo (2016) find, because it seems that many of the
corruption convictions reported by PIN fall under categories that we may want to exclude.
For example, postal workers convicted of mail fraud may not be our primary concern in a
broader study of corruption at the higher levels of government. While the TRACfed data
won’t identify a postal worker, per se, it will identify the lead charge in a case, which we
can use to limit the scope of corrupt activities to those we’re most concerned about.
For this paper, I aggregate the TRACfed data as follows. I allow for cases designated as
“public corruption” cases by the DOJ. Those include federal, state, and local cases, as well
as a category designated as “other public corruption,” which I fold into a measure of total
corruption, but otherwise don’t examine specifically. I include cases with lead charges that
are clearly identified as related to corruption, but I exclude certain cases that are likely to
be representative of lesser crimes committed by lower-level employees.
I include only cases that have been disposed of, which means that they’ve either been
prosecuted or dismissed outright (disposition can imply a wide range of potential outcomes,
5The complete case-level data from 1986 to 2009 was made available to me under fellowship with TRAC.
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Figure 3: Corruption Cases in the United States
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but these are by far the most common). My primary interest is in convictions, which I can
infer from a variable indicating the disposition type, whether it be a guilty verdict or not.
I can also observe the date of the conviction and the date that a case was initially referred
to the DOJ. Finally, I know in which state each case is considered. I aggregate the data by
state, level of government, and year—either the year of referral or the year of conviction—to
generate total, federal, state, and local measures of convictions as well as referrals over time
and across states.
I plot corruption case referrals, prosecutions and convictions in Figure 3, and then con-
victions by category in Figure 4. Note that prosecutions and convictions have remained
relatively stable over time, with a slight trend toward convergence. In other words, pros-
ecuted cases more often lead to convictions. Among convictions, local convictions are the
only category that seems to have experienced any significant growth. Otherwise, the inci-
dence of corruption as measured by convictions has been relatively flat since 1986.
For a more detailed exposition of the variables in the TRACfed data and the specific ad-
justments made to those data, see Appendix A.1.
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Figure 4: Corruption Convictions in the United States, by Level of Government
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Editor & Publisher
Editor & Publisher provides data on newspaper circulation in the U.S., and has been in
print since the early 1900s. I use their printed “Data Books” going back to 1975 (published
annually) to procure data on the total numbers of newspapers by state and year, as well as
the numbers of new publications and ceased publications. The books include detailed data
about individual newspapers as well, but it’s out of the scope of this project to procure
the richer dataset that might be of use in future work. Gentzkow et al. (2011) use these
data to estimate the effect that entry and exit in the newspaper industry has on election
outcomes in the U.S. To my knowledge, there is no rival to Editor & Publisher for detailed
data on newspapers in America. The ‘Data Book’ was originally created for advertisers,
and so E&P has had an incentive to keep it up to date and comprehensive. It is fortuitous
that these data are now relatively accessible.
In Figure 5, I plot the total number of dailies between 1986 and 2010. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, dailies have seen a steady decline, accompanied by a decline in newspaper employment,
as measured by County Business Patterns. While some 435,256 people were employed in
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the industry in 1986, by 2009 that number had fallen to 290,759 (I use the NAICS designa-
tion for newspaper publishers). The decline in newspapers can be seen through more than
one lens, which potentially complicates the empirical analysis. While print newspapers,
especially dailies, have been in decline, online media has been on the rise, and radio and
television don’t seem to have suffered the fate that print has. The media landscape has
shifted, but perhaps that isn’t indicative of any dramatic change in investigative journalism
in the U.S.
I think this is a fair critique. My response is that this paper is not concerned with the
long-run trends in the news industry, but rather the localized changes in news from year to
year. And in this regard, newspaper entry and exit provides a cleaner empirical approach
than other media. Except for a handful of newspapers with national readership, most
dailies cater to a highly localized market. This is evident in the Editor & Publisher data,
which specifically lists newspapers by state and city, highlighting only a few outliers where
readership clearly extends well beyond a newspaper’s headquarters.
Furthermore, while journalism and investigative reporting may have a growing presence
in online media and have always been a part of television and radio, it is still reasonable
to expect that consolidation and closures in newspapers may have localized impacts on
productivity year-on-year for the media in a particular state. All that this requires is some
friction in media labor markets. On the other hand, it is possible that investigative reporting
is less reliant on newspaper funding than it once was, in which case we might expect to see
little impact from newspaper entry and exit.
Supplementary Data
I pull additional data on government employment and government finances from the Census
of Governments. These data provide two important measures. The first is a measure of
total state and local government employment, which I use to standardize the indicators I
use. Rather than looking at the level or growth rate of convictions, I look at convictions
18
Figure 5: Daily Newspapers in the United States
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per 100,000 state and local public employees. That’s a reasonably standard practice in the
literature and allows for meaningful comparisons across states. The second variable I use
is total state expenditures, which I divide by the number of state and local employees to
account for changes over time in state spending that might be correlated with changes in
opportunities for corruption.
Other supplementary data include state population, population density, and state real GDP
levels, all from publicly available datasets.
1.5. Empirical Strategy
Let s index states and t index years. The outcomes of interest, which I’ll collectively refer
to as cst, include convictions as a share of public employees, either in the aggregate or at
the federal, state, and local levels separately (referrals are also considered as an outcome
of interest). My primary independent variable is nst, which I also define in more than one
way, but is generally the number of daily newspaper publications per public employee.
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I model the relationship between cst and nst as follows:
cst =
4∑
k=0
βkns(t−k) + γxst + αs + ηt + εst (1.7)
where αs is a state effect, ηt is a year effect, xst is a vector of covariates (government expen-
ditures per employee, state real GDP, government employment, and population density),
and εst is a state-year shock. I lag nst in order to account for the delay in timing between
the opening of corruption investigations and convictions. That process takes an average of
550 days (or 378 days at the median), and that just accounts for the time after the referral
has been handed off to the DOJ. There is an additional gap between the time of the initial
investigation and the time of the referral, and yet another gap between the investigation
and the instance of corruption, neither of which I am able to measure. I hypothesize that
within the 1–3 year range preceding a potential conviction, a newspaper has its investigative
opportunity and is likely to be most impactful. However, if the variability in time between
criminal actions, investigations, and convictions is sufficiently high, I expect to find little
evidence of any measurable relationship using this specification.
It’s worth noting that I’ve omitted potentially important variables here by proxying for in-
vestigative reporting with the number of newspapers per government employee. Newspaper
profitability, in particular is unobserved, and may interact with convictions in some unex-
pected ways. While newspaper entry and exit represents a clear indicator for a localized
decline in the employment of local journalists, exit decisions in particular may be subject
to pre-trends in profitability that impact employment years before the newspaper actually
fails. Those fluctuations in employment and other resources may have a meaningful impact
on the newspaper’s investigative capacity. If that’s the case, then we might expect to see
changes in conviction rates long before a newspaper exits the market. On the other hand,
if those changes are spread out over time, the effect on my estimates of βk post-exit are
likely to be attenuating. If the full impact of an exit isn’t realized fully at the time of exit,
it follows that the measured impact at the time of exit is smaller than it otherwise might
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have been. I test this using a modified specification with pre-trends. I find the results are
mixed. I’ll discuss the results in the next section.
I find that my measures of convictions and newspapers fail to pass the Wooldridge test for
autocorrelation in panel data sets, so I estimate the model in first differences. The modified
model specification is given by
∆cst =
4∑
k=0
βk∆ns(t−k) + γ∆xst + ηt + ∆εst (1.8)
This is the model I estimate. As noted above, I also test for pre-trends in some specifications,
in which case I extend lags in ∆nst to include two leads. Because my sample includes data
from 1986 to 2009, I am somewhat limited in the degree to which I can lag or lead the
independent variables without sacrificing observations.
Because the model is estimated in first differences, I’m able to incorporate two measures of
∆nst rather than rely on just the aggregate level nst. The first is the simple difference in
the number of dailies from year to year. Note that this measure may fluctuate for reasons
unrelated to explicit entry and exit. In particular, newspapers may merge, convert from a
daily to a weekly, a weekly to a daily, or simply split into two or more publications. Each of
these results in a measured change in the number of newspapers, but the degree to which
each represents a meaningful change in investigative capacity is indeterminate. For that
reason I take advantage of a feature of the data that allows me to directly observe entry as
a new publication or exit in the form of an actual closure. The degree of variation in this
data is limited. I observe just 89 new publications and 153 closures over a 24 year period.
Furthermore, clean entry and exit may not actually reflect investigative capacity any better
than the change in the total number of dailies. But it does present an opportunity to
estimate the model using more than one measure of entry and exit. For that reason, I use
both measures in the results presented in the next section.
Finally, because changes in cst and nst tend to be more volatile in smaller states, I weight
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the sample by state population as a share of total population to limit the small states’
impact on the final estimates. This is particularly important, as small states tend to have
very low levels of convictions, augmented by infrequent spikes. That variation contrasts
with larger states, where corruption convictions are more common and relatively consistent
from year to year.
The results shown in the next section include estimates using multiple definitions of corrup-
tion. I have total, federal, state, and local corruption at the state-year level. I look at both
convictions and corruption case referrals as well, but the primary distinctions between the
estimates are between the levels of government. Given that high-ranking federal employees
tend to be concentrated in DC, I wouldn’t expect local newspapers to have a significant
impact on corruption at that level. On the other hand, state and local officials are ideal
targets for the local news. My prior is that if there is a measurable effect of newspapers
on corruption, that it will show up in the state and local estimates more so than in the
federal estimates for the simple reason that state and local newspapers have an advantage
investigating state and local corruption, while higher level corruption tends to be covered
nationally.
1.6. Results
Before delving into the primary results, a brief discussion of the relationship between in-
vestigative reporting and newspaper entry and exit is warranted. As stated in the previous
section, my empirical strategy depends on newspaper entry and exit effectively proxying for
investigative capacity. I test that relationship by running the following simple regression:
∆ log(rst) = α0 +
2∑
k=−2
λk∆ log(nst) + ∆εst
where rst is the number of reporters employed in state s and year t. Those data are available
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Wage Data as well as the Census Bureau’s
County Business Patterns data. The results of the first-difference estimates are shown
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Table 1: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Newspaper Entry and Exit on
Reporter Employment
Log Reporters (Occupational
Wage Data)
Log Reporters (County
Business Patterns)
∆ Log Dailies [t+ 2] .050 .158∗∗
(.492) (.075)
∆ Log Dailies [t+ 1] .049 –.081
(.591) (.063)
∆ Log Dailies .796+ .211∗
(.478) (.124)
∆ Log Dailies [t− 1] –.074 .078
(.376) (.080)
∆ Log Dailies [t− 2] .285 –.126
(.403) (.153)
∆ Log Real GDP .335 .127
(.498) (.108)
∆ Population Density –2.167 .275
(2.725) (.719)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 .064 .087
N 500 950
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent
variables are both logged. The Occupational Wage Data start in 1997, while the County Business
Patterns data start in 1986. Estimates are weighted by state population, and standard errors are
clustered at the state level.
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in Table 1. The contemporaneous impact in both models is modestly significant. The
Occupational Wage Data yield an elasticity of .796, while the County Business Patterns
estimate is much smaller, at .211, but nevertheless positive and meaningfully significant
relative to the leads and lags (apart from the two period lead). The significant estimate on
the two-period lead in the latter model may indicate a pre-trend, as discussed in the previous
section. The implication is that reporter employment changes may, and likely do, precede
a firm’s formal market exit. In this case, it’s somewhat suggestive that the significant
lead shows up only in the second model and that its magnitude, at .158, is still less than
the contemporaneous effect. It’s a concern, but not entirely unexpected. At the very
least, the results point to a significant contemporaneous relationship between newspaper
entry and exit and reporter employment. That need not necessarily imply a significant
relationship between entry, exit and investigative reporting, but it’s highly suggestive, and
lends credibility to entry and exit as a proxy.
Main Results
Table 2 presents the results from regressing the year-on-year changes in convictions per
100,000 state and local public employees on the year-on-year changes in dailies per 10,000
employees. The dependent variables are differentiated by the level of corruption involved.
I include total convictions along with federal, state, and local convictions separately. The
results are relatively weak, but I do find that the second lag on dailies is significant at
the 10% level for state convictions, and the magnitude of the effect strongly outweighs the
measured effects on the other lags in the state regression. The implication is that one
additional newspaper is associated with a drop in convictions of .88 per 100,000 public
employees. Given that the average level of convictions of state officials in the sample is
.21 per 100,000, that represents a substantial decline (for reference, the weighted average
number of dailies per 10,000 employees is .8). On the other hand, the data don’t point to
any significant relationship between newspapers and corruption convictions for federal and
local officials.
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It is surprising that the estimate for local officials is insignificant while the state estimate
shows some indication of significance. As mentioned previously, my prior would be that
these two categories would be more likely to show some effect than the federal category.
The difference does not seem to be attributable to the relative severity of state and local
corruption. Looking at the limited sentencing data that I have from TRACfed, which covers
cases after 1990, there don’t appear to be any significant differences between state and local
prison sentences, probation time, and fines.6 Perhaps an alternative explanation is that
local officials generally have a lower profile than state officials. If newspapers are more
likely to investigate corruption at the state level because state-level corruption is a better
sell to a larger regional market than local level corruption, then perhaps it isn’t so surprising
that I don’t measure any meaningful effect on local convictions from newspaper entry and
exit. Unfortunately, this theory requires more data to test properly. It’s a question that’s
outside the scope of this paper.
In Table 3, I provide the estimates for referrals rather than convictions. On the hypothesis
that perhaps referrals to the DOJ are more indicative of corruption levels, and in particu-
lar, corruption levels affected by investigative reporting, I re-estimate the model using the
referrals metric. The results are insignificant. There is perhaps a negative bias in years
prior to and including t − 2, but the data don’t suggest a strong link between newspapers
and referrals to the DOJ overall. This isn’t particularly surprising given the previous result
that state convictions are negatively impacted by dailies. A negative impact suggests that
newspapers have more of a deterrent effect on convictions than a detection effect. Oth-
erwise, the loss of a paper would precipitate a loss in convictions. But if newspapers are
more deterrent than enforcer, then we shouldn’t necessarily expect there to be a strong re-
lationship between newspaper entry and exit and the referrals that the DOJ receives. The
6The reliability of these data is difficult to verify. However, for reference, of the guilty verdicts that
resulted in some sentencing, the mean prison sentence was 24.7 months for state officials and 27.5 months
for local officials. The mean probation time was 14.9 months for state officials and 13.2 months for local
officials. And the mean fine was $28,664 for state officials and $19,063 for local officials. The differences in
fines may seem meaningful, but the standard deviations are an order of magnitude larger than the point
estimates.
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timing of the referrals isn’t dependent on newspaper investigations. Rather it’s a function
of the criminal justice system and institutional constraints. But newspapers can still play a
significant role as a deterrent, and we may be able to pick that up in the data more easily.
Perhaps this is closer to what the data suggest.
Splitting the Sample by Time
In addition to the average long-term impacts that newspapers have had on corruption
convictions, I am also interested in looking at whether those effects are consistent over time
or if they’ve shifted. There are a lot of reasons to think that the marginal impact of a
newspaper might change over time. Perhaps the impact of the deterrence effect over the
detection effect has shifted as newspapers have declined in general (see the discussion of
this in the model section), or perhaps prosecutions get pushed through the criminal justice
system more slowly and so the timing of the newspaper effect might shift over time. There
is some evidence for the latter, as the median time from referral to conviction has gone
from 233 days in 1986 to 521 days in 2009. Another reason that we might expect to see
differences over time in the measured effect is that online media and alternative suppliers of
investigative reporting have become far more prevalent in more recent years than in the mid-
1990’s when the Internet was still in its infancy. Labor market frictions for reporters were
likely higher in the 1990’s than in the mid-2000’s when the spread of high-speed Internet
made it possible for any reporter to move more quickly to an online news outlet or to work
freelance. The Internet may have also lowered the costs to investigative reporting as the
government put more records online. While a newspaper failure might still have a localized
impact on corruption in the mid-2000’s, the market was better suited to respond, and so
measuring an effect on a year-on-year basis is likely to be much more difficult.
In Table 4, I divide the sample into a 1991-1999 subset and a 2000-2009 subset. A few things
become apparent. The significance of the second lagged effect becomes far more pronounced
in the 2000-2009 subset, and especially for the total and state conviction categories. On the
other hand, the estimates for the 1991-1999 subset are mixed. The 3rd lag in the federal
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Table 5: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Convictions per 100,000 Public
Employees on Reporters per 10,000 Public Employees (1991-2009)
Total Federal State Local
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) .002 .001 .000 –.000
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.003)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 1] –.002 .004 –.001 –.003+
(.005) (.004) (.001) (.003)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 2] .004 .002 .002∗ .001
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 3] –.000 –.002 .000 .000
(.003) (.002) (.001) (.002)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 4] .001 .003 –.000 –.001
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Govt Exp per Emp .017 –.001 –.000 .014
(.025) (.016) (.004) (.011)
∆ Log Real GDP –2.052 –.385 –1.189∗ .136
(2.906) (2.451) (.680) (1.054)
∆ Log Govt Emp .132 –2.781 .893 1.046
(3.840) (2.946) (1.285) (1.954)
∆ Population Density –15.674+ –6.773 .411 –12.533∗∗
(9.643) (8.580) (3.368) (5.947)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .036 .025 .028 .062
N 887 887 887 887
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates are weighted
by state population, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
category and the 4th lag in the state category have the highest significance, and overall the
estimates imply a negative relationship between dailies and convictions, but it’s difficult to
draw any strong conclusions. What is clear is that the effects aren’t precisely consistent
across time.
Alternative Measure of Investigative Reporting
A potential criticism of the approach I’ve taken is that it doesn’t directly account for inves-
tigative reporting done by actual reporters. Perhaps a better approach would be to measure
the impact that changes in reporters have on convictions. However, the problem with look-
ing at reporters alone is twofold: variation in labor over time tends to be too smooth to
make any meaningful inferences based on year-on-year changes, and even where there are
30
changes in the numbers of reporters, they don’t necessarily reflect other important features
of the newspaper industry that are likely to affect investigative reporting, including the
provision of resources necessary for conducting serious research (i.e., capital expenditures).
Furthermore, public officials are unlikely to observe the numbers of reporters changing over
time, and so it’s unlikely to be a key consideration for corruption. The closure of a local
newspaper, on the other hand, is unlikely to go unnoticed. In Table 5, I use the County
Business Patterns data to estimate the inter-temporal impact of reporters on convictions,
and I find that the results are mostly statistically insignificant, and certainly economically
insignificant.
Pre-Trends
In Table 6 and 7, I deal with pre-trends in the data. Table 6 includes two leads on the
dailies variable, neither of which is strongly significant in any of the categories, although
the local category shows a slight pre-trend bias. The primary results from Table 2 haven’t
changed materially, and on balance the coefficients on the lead terms in the local regression
net out to an insignificant sum, but I do consider the possibility that there is a slight
pre-trend. As discussed previously, one potential explanation is that newspaper closures
in particular are preceded by a drawdown in resources, effectively preempting the sharp
decline in investigative capacity that I’m looking for in market exits. That can show up
as a pre-trend in the data. One way to potentially control for that is to include reporters
in the regression as a control for resources in the leading periods. If an adjustment in the
number of reporters is enough to explain the pre-trend, we ought to see the coefficients on
the lead terms become insignficant.
Table 7 provides the results of the regressions with reporters included as a control. Surpris-
ingly, the lead terms on dailies are ever so slightly more significant (although on balance,
they appear to net out to effectively zero). On the other hand, the second lag in the state
category is slightly stronger.
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Table 6: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Convictions per 100,000 Public
Employees on Dailies per 10,000 Public Employees (1991-2007, with pre-trends)
Total Federal State Local
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 2] –2.486 –.429 –.733 –1.558+
(2.250) (1.779) (.567) (1.169)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 1] 4.624+ 1.601 .194 3.175∗
(3.216) (1.804) (.695) (1.611)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) –1.928 –.777 .092 –1.281
(3.254) (2.882) (.671) (1.344)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 1] .081 –.543 –.143 .612
(1.289) (1.271) (.525) (.865)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 2] –.632 .683 –.716+ .017
(2.290) (1.907) (.439) (1.086)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 3] .347 –1.473 .363 .344
(2.224) (1.560) (.730) (.969)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 4] .185 1.270 –.441 .541
(2.064) (1.310) (.462) (.974)
∆ Govt Exp per Emp .022 –.001 –.005 .022+
(.035) (.023) (.005) (.016)
∆ Log Real GDP –2.519 –1.149 –1.441+ .783
(2.751) (1.951) (.885) (1.062)
∆ Log Govt Emp .258 –1.153 .387 .691
(6.899) (6.250) (1.454) (1.697)
∆ Population Density –13.768 –8.718 3.699 –11.472∗
(13.403) (11.926) (4.385) (5.888)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .040 .022 .028 .075
N 790 790 790 790
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates are weighted
by state population, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 7: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Convictions per 100,000 Pub-
lic Employees on Dailies per 10,000 Public Employees and Reporters per 10,000 Public
Employees (1991-2007, with pre-trends)
Total Federal State Local
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 2] –3.626+ –.807 –.750+ –2.227∗
(2.449) (1.781) (.524) (1.131)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 1] 5.144+ 1.899 .248 3.076∗
(3.346) (1.934) (.678) (1.638)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) –1.581 –.346 .034 –1.290
(3.103) (2.796) (.672) (1.301)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 1] .859 –1.044 .154 1.524∗
(1.616) (1.387) (.575) (.860)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 2] –1.347 .440 –.937∗ –.461
(2.150) (1.735) (.483) (1.091)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 3] .431 –1.075 .295 .230
(2.216) (1.668) (.709) (.914)
∆ Dailies (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 4] .118 1.030 –.375 .779
(1.973) (1.178) (.491) (.922)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 2] .007 .002 –.000 .005+
(.006) (.004) (.001) (.003)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t + 1] –.006+ –.003 –.001 –.000
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) –.001 –.003 .000 .000
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.003)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 1] –.005 .003 –.002+ –.005+
(.006) (.003) (.001) (.003)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 2] .003 .000 .002+ .003+
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 3] –.000 –.001 –.000 –.000
(.003) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Reporters (per 10,000 govt emp) [t− 4] –.001 .002 –.000 –.002
(.004) (.003) (.001) (.002)
∆ Govt Exp per Emp .016 .000 –.007+ .017
(.034) (.023) (.005) (.015)
∆ Log Real GDP –2.527 –1.103 –1.345+ .575
(2.643) (1.933) (.887) (1.057)
∆ Log Govt Emp –.520 –1.530 .145 .144
(6.726) (6.106) (1.428) (1.849)
∆ Population Density –13.337 –7.924 3.256 –11.377∗
(13.276) (12.742) (3.956) (6.382)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .052 .029 .036 .095
N 790 790 790 790
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates are weighted
by state population, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Table 8: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Newspaper Entry and Exit
(Alternative Measure) on Reporter Employment
Log Reporters (Occupational
Wage Data)
Log Reporters (County Business
Patterns)
% Net New Dailies [t + 2] .990 –.108
(1.252) (.098)
% Net New Dailies [t + 1] –.518 –.034
(1.284) (.106)
% Net New Dailies .435 .376+
(.911) (.238)
% Net New Dailies [t− 1] –.732 .275+
(.953) (.197)
% Net New Dailies [t− 2] 1.942∗ –.126
(1.026) (.137)
∆ State Real GDP Growth Rate .286 .110
(.495) (.110)
∆ Population Density –3.706+ –.073
(2.630) (.752)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
R2 .069 .086
N 500 950
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variables are
both logged. The Occupational Wage Data start in 1997, while the County Business Patterns data start
in 1986. Estimates are weighted by state population, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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Alternative Measure of Entry and Exit
As a final variation on the previous regressions, I consider an alternative measure of entry
and exit. The change in dailies is certainly indicative of market entry and exit, but it fails
to exclude mergers, spin-offs, and conversions within the industry, which happen frequently.
It’s not unreasonable to question whether these types of changes contribute materially to
changes in investigative capacity. It may be optimal to look specifically at new entrants
and closures. The Editor & Publisher data allow me to do exactly that. I explore this
alternative measure in the last two tables.
Table 8 repeats the analysis from Table 1 using the alternative measure of entry and exit,
which I define here as net new dailies as a share of existing dailies. The results suggest
that the measure is correlated with the employment of reporters, but the relationship is
decidedly weaker than in Table 1, although the magnitude of the concurrent and lagged
effect in the County Business Patterns regression are higher.
I repeat the analysis from Table 2 in Table 9, which now shows a statistically significant
negative effect on the third lag in the total, federal, and local regressions (although, curi-
ously, no significant effect in the state regression). Those effects appear to be somewhat
diminished by positive fourth lag effects, but on balance these results do appear to suggest
that the deterrent effect outweighs the detection effect over the medium term.
1.7. Conclusion
There remains a need for further research in the field of corruption, especially as it relates to
its underlying causes and effective enforcement mechanisms. The current literature strongly
suggests that media plays an important role in deterring corrupt actors, but we still know
very little about the underlying mechanism at play. Is the media purely a conveyor of
information, dependent on formal investigation and the criminal justice system to uncover
corrupt activity, or is it a significant active contributor to that investigative effort?
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Table 9: Regression Estimates for the Marginal Impact of Convictions per 100,000 Public
Employees on Net New Dailies as a Share of Existing Dailies (1991-2009)
Total Federal State Local
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) .275 .887 –.178 .089
(4.671) (4.891) (.877) (2.238)
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) [t− 1] –4.682 –2.863 .699 –2.469
(4.195) (3.134) (1.490) (2.445)
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) [t− 2] 5.926 3.507 –.763 3.649∗
(5.066) (3.355) (1.203) (2.070)
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) [t− 3] –9.965∗∗ –7.106∗∗ .157 –4.025∗∗
(4.072) (3.277) (1.044) (1.700)
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) [t− 4] 8.003+ 4.377+ –.696 3.659+
(5.457) (3.189) (1.239) (2.317)
Net New Dailies (% of existing dailies) [t− 5] –3.223 1.294 .043 –2.690
(6.875) (3.605) (2.245) (2.459)
∆ Govt Exp per Emp .022 –.002 .001 .017+
(.022) (.015) (.004) (.011)
∆ Log Real GDP –2.266 –.390 –1.209∗ –.036
(2.892) (2.454) (.689) (1.075)
∆ Log Govt Emp –.264 –2.718 .891 1.010
(3.805) (3.069) (1.285) (1.824)
∆ Population Density –15.972∗ –7.126 .080 –11.137∗
(8.889) (7.765) (3.580) (5.807)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 .045 .028 .024 .069
N 887 887 887 887
Standard errors in parentheses. + p < 0.2, * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates are weighted
by state population, and standard errors are clustered at the state level.
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The results presented in this paper are mixed. I provide some evidence the the deterrent
effect appears to outweigh the detection effect on balance, especially among state officials
(although it matters how one measures the marginal newspaper). I also provide evidence
that the deterrent effect has strengthened with time. But more precise measures of inves-
tigative reporting are needed to refine these results.
There are significant weaknesses in the analysis as well. I look specifically at newspapers, but
clearly radio, television, and online-only publications are becoming increasingly important.
How they interact with each other, and whether changes in medium meaningfully impacts
the effectiveness of reporting at the local and state levels is an open question. We need new
research to deal with these issues.
This research is important if we want to affect policy around the enforcement of corruption
laws and information openness. FOIA laws are a good example of this. Perhaps states
and the federal government need to go further to keep the flow of information to the media
more open. Or perhaps the optimal solution to corruption is a strengthening of formal
institutions around law enforcement and internal auditing. Understanding the media’s role
in corruption enforcement is crucial to improving policy.
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CHAPTER 2 : MORTGAGE DEBT AND SOCIAL NORMS: A LOOK AT
RELIGION
2.1. Introduction
The classical economic framework for modeling the consumer’s borrowing decision takes
as given some variation in consumer preferences for risk, and relies primarily on external
borrowing constraints in the form of standards imposed by lenders and public policy in
addition to expectations about future income or the value of the asset being borrowed
against, etc. While psychologists and behavioral economists have long considered alternative
models to explain the behavior consumers exhibit under uncertainty, the problem remains
very much open to additional research.
In the wake of the financial crisis in 2008, the relevance of the problem of consumer choice
in borrowing decisions has grown all the more prescient. It seems that the key determinant
of foreclosures after 2008 was the rise in “underwater” mortgages, i.e., mortgages with
loan-to-value ratios in excess of 1. Understandably, the incentives for underwater borrowers
are strongly tilted toward default, so it is not surprising to observe a high frequency of
foreclosures on homes with loan-to-value ratios over 1. The question remains, however, as
to what can explain the variation in initial loan-to-value ratios, and which factors contribute
to “riskier” borrowing behavior, by which I mean borrowing at loan-to-value ratios close to
1.
Religion presents itself as one potentially meaningful piece of this puzzle. Or rather, not
just religion as a faith system, but religion as an indicator for a particular set of norms
deeply embedded in adherents to the faith. The founding text on religion and economics,
Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, essentially argues that
the protestant ideals of frugality, hard work and thrift, laid the groundwork for modern
capitalism. He describes a faith that encouraged self-sacrifice and limiting excess, not
exactly the hallmarks of a society keen on incurring excessive levels of debt. These values
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extend well beyond protestantism. In Judaism, the Hebrew Bible and the Talmud refer to
the charging of interest as a sin. Islam has a similar view on debt—the longest ayah, or
verse, in the Quran (2:282) is about the sinful nature of debt. Even Buddhism and other
Eastern faiths espouse a life detached from material possessions and worldly pursuits. Given
the conservative nature of religion, it is worth asking whether religious affiliation has any
bearing on actual borrowing behavior, and whether we can learn anything from the way
that religion reinforces these norms within social groups to better inform financial education
and public policy.
I explore the relationship between religious affiliation within protestant, Catholic and other
Christian faiths in the U.S. and borrowing behavior in the form of initial loan-to-value
ratios on home mortgages. I find that there is a link between religion and borrowing in
that religious groups seem to take on less mortgage debt relative to the values of the homes
being purchased. I compare counties with growing religious populations over the decade
between 2000 and 2010 to counties where religious participations declined in order to test
the hypothesis that religious affiliation is associated with the social norms that govern risk
taking and, in particular, the amount of debt people are willing to incur when buying a
home.
To avoid some of the problems with endogeneity in a cross-sectional analysis, I use a
difference-in-differences approach in which I treat the counties with growing religious pop-
ulations as part of the so-called “treatment” group, while those that don’t see any growth
in religious participation are assigned to a “control” group. I’m taking liberties in us-
ing “treatment” and “control” as such, since the variation in county religious membership
clearly isn’t randomly determined as one would expect in a traditional quasi-experimental
analysis. However, it is reasonable to assume that religious affiliation in a particular county
isn’t strongly determined by the economic factors that we might more readily model borrow-
ing behavior on, including income, average home price, FHA loan eligibility, socio-economic
status, etc. To the extent that it might be, I control for those factors that I observe in my
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data.
I find that counties with growing religious populations have average loan-to-value ratios
that are .0192 less (about 2% of the average loan-to-value ratio) than counties that have
static or declining religious populations, a result that is both statistically significant and
economically meaningful. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that while religious affiliation is
associated with lower loan-to-value ratios on average across counties, the percentage of
borrowers that identify as black is insignificant. Black culture in America has a long history
of culture and societal norms that distinguish it from those of other race groups. While
we wouldn’t necessarily expect race to be a determining factor in borrowing behavior, it is
noteworthy that religion, which is also associated with distinct cultures and social norms
would have a discernible impact on borrowing behavior while race has none (after controlling
for other observable factors, including religion).
I proceed as follows. In section 2.2, I review some of the literature on religion and borrowing
behavior and recent work on the 2008 foreclosure crisis. In section 2.3, I give an overview
of the data I use to estimate the relationship between religion and debt. In section 2.4,
I provide a brief discussion of the empirical strategy, its strengths and its weaknesses. In
section 2.5, I summarize the main results of the paper. And in section 2.6, I conclude.
Additional tables can be found in the Appendix.
2.2. Literature Review
Perhaps unsurprisingly, religion hasn’t been extensively studied in connection with borrow-
ing behavior. It does, however, fit into a broader literature on the predictors of mortgage
default, and it is clearly apiece with the literature on social and cultural norms and their
impact on human behavior and economic outcomes.
Despite the relatively paucity of research on this particular subject, there is one study
that does examine the relationship between religion and attitudes toward debt. Davies
and Lea (1995) look at potential determinants of attitudes towards debt and debt levels
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among college students. Using survey data, they find that non-religious students have higher
levels of personal debt than religious students and that non-Christian students tend to have
more negative attitudes towards debt than Christian students (although the magnitude of
the effect is relatively small). They also look at age, gender, year of study, expenditure
patterns, and credit card usage. In general they find that debt is more common among
older male students and that higher expenditures tend to correlate with a looser attitude
toward debt in general. Their results are limited in scope and subject to small sample
concerns, but indicate that religiosity may be of some importance in predicting borrowing
behavior.
Guiso et al. (2003) and Guiso et al. (2006) look at how religion impacts economic attitudes
using a cross-country panel. They find that religion is positively correlated with “good”
economic attitudes, i.e., practices that are conducive to economic growth, but they do not
look specifically at debt as it relates to religion. They find that religious people tend to
exhibit higher levels of trust in other people and in institutions, and are less willing to break
the law.
Mersland et al. (2013) look at how religion affects economic development by studying Chris-
tian and secular microfinance institutions. They have no discussion of borrowing behavior,
but the paper does address the lending side. They find that Christian lending organizations
are less profitable than their non-Christian peers, but that the difference is due primarily
to lower funding costs rather than differences in loan repayment or average loan size.
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) look at the relationship between religion and education in
the U.S., finding that religious activity rises with education across individuals, but declines
with education across denominations. They propose that the link between education and
religious activity is in the social benefits of organized religion, but that faith in organized
religion declines with education levels, suggesting that there is a plausible link between
religion and other behavior that is highly dependent on educational levels.
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Some recent research looks more broadly at the impacts that social and cultural norms have
on borrowing behavior.
Cynamon and Fazzari (2008) look at how social and cultural norms might have influenced
debt over the past quarter century. They argue, somewhat tenuously, that media, inno-
vation, and evolving social interactions have shaped the American consumer’s attitudes
towards consumption and debt and precipitated the rising debt levels leading into the 2008
financial crisis. Stone and Maury (2006) examine debt accumulation among Air Force per-
sonnel. They conclude that “indebtedness [is] a multi-faceted behavior which is comprised
of demographic/institutional, financial, economic, psychological, and situational aspects,
each critically important to the overall explanation of indebtedness behavior.”
More recently, Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) use a large panel dataset on borrowers between
1997 and 2012 to estimate the impact that high current loan-to-value ratios have on bor-
rowers’ propensity to default. They find that current negative equity almost completely
explains foreclosure propensity, particularly among prime borrowers. They also look at
whether race and income have any discernible role to play, and find that neither is mean-
ingfully predictive. Their work, however, highlights the importance of more meaningful
research into the determinants of borrowing behavior. We still know relatively little about
what factors matter in the borrower’s decision to take on a loan at a high loan-to-value ra-
tio, despite the fact that those borrowers are disproportionately impacted by an unexpected
drop in the value of their collateral, as we saw in the 2008 foreclosure crisis.
2.3. Data
The three primary data sources for this paper include detailed micro-level home purchase
data available from the vendor DataQuick, similarly detailed mico-level home mortgage loan
data made available under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), and aggregated
county-level U.S. church membership data from the Association of Religion Data Archives
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(ARDA).7 I summarize the data in two parts. First, the home purchase and mortgage data,
and then the religion data.
Home purchase and mortgage data
The home purchase and mortgage data I use cover the years 1997 through 2009. I merge
the purchase data with the mortgage data and aggregate by county and year. I restrict
the sample to include single family homes with transaction values between $5,000 and $7
million and exclude purchases in which the recorded initial loan-to-value ratio exceeds 1.
I construct measures of loan-to-value (LTV) and loan-to-income (LTI) based on reported
income and loan levels in the HMDA data and house prices as reported in the DataQuick
data.
The data are aggregated at the county-year level. I am able to generate measures for the
mean loan-to-value ratio, the mean loan-to-income ratio, the percentage of borrowers with
a fixed-rate mortgage, the percentage of borrowers with FHA loans, and the percentage
of borrowers who identify as black. The data cover major metropolitan statistical areas
in Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Nevada, New
York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee and Washington. The final data set incorporates
some 126 counties across 13 years. I supplement these data with average county income
levels from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The county-year data are summarized in
Table 10.
The mean county loan-to-value ratio in the sample is 0.84 with a standard deviation of
0.05. The empirical sample distribution is plotted in figure 6. Note that the distribution is
heavily clustered around the mean, but does skew to the left where a handful of counties
have average LTV ratios as low as 0.58. Those extreme cases are highly limited. In Figure
7, I plot the empirical sample distribution of LTI ratios. These are much are more variable.
7The 2000 data were downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, and were collected by
the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies. The 2010 data were downloaded from the
Associate of Religion Data Archives as well, and were collected by the Clifford Grammich, Kirk Hadaway,
Richard Houseal, Dale E. Jones, Alexei Krindatch, Richie Stanley, and Richard H. Taylor.
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Table 10: Summary Statistics for the DataQuick and HMDA Data
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan Attributes
Mean loan-to-value ratio 0.84 0.05 0.58 0.93
Mean loan-to-income ratio 2.63 0.55 1.11 4.13
% fixed-rate loans 75.9 22.9 0.0 100.0
% FHA loans 12.8 13.5 0.0 63.8
Buyer Attributes
Mean income 96,031 39,777 36,191 345,200
% black 2.9 4.7 0.0 33.3
The DataQuick and HMDA data are transaction-level data which I aggregate to the county-year level.
These summary statistics cover 1,646 county-year observations between 1997 and 2009. The mean LTV,
mean LTI, and mean income variables are constructed as the simple means of the underlying data at the
county-year level.
The mean county LTI ratio is 2.63 with a standard deviation of 0.55. These data skew to
the right, but not by much. The maximum average LTI ratio in the sample is 4.13. There is
substantial variation in the percentage of fixed-rate loans, percentage of FHA loans, average
county income, and the percentage of borrowers who identify as black.
Religion data
I use religion data available from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA), which
surveys religious organizations in the U.S. every 10 years and compiles county-level member-
ship totals for each reporting religion. The survey is not fully representative of all churches
in the U.S., but does account for most religions, as well as some some smaller and lesser
known religious groups. The data are available as far back as 1906, however, given the
restricted home purchase and mortgage dataset, I restrict the religion data to the years
2000 and 2010.
The primary variable of interest is “total adherents.” Adherents include formal members,
but may also incorporate non-members who are nevertheless closely affiliated with the
church (e.g., unbaptized children in some Christian faiths). These data are obtained by
surveying church organizations, which don’t always report a measure of adherents. In some
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Figure 6: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Mean Loan-to-Value (LTV) Ratios
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Figure 7: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Mean Loan-to-Income (LTI) Ratios
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cases, the data are imputed. 8 Where disparities or irregularities arise (e.g., unusual changes
in the number of members in a county) in the reported data, ARDA makes a concerted
effort to confirm the data with the reporting organizations.
I use Census population measures by county for 2000 and 2010 to construct a variable for
membership as a share of population in each county in each year. I then generate a share
change variable, which is the percentage point change in the share of each county that
identifies as religious between 2000 and 2010.
Religious groups vary dramatically in size and in location. I restrict my sample to religions
that show significant membership and a substantial national presence, which I define as
a church having no fewer than 250,000 members across the U.S. in 2010, and where none
are represented in fewer than 800 of the 3,149 counties in the country. I exclude Judaism,
Islam, and East Asian religions both on those grounds, but also because these tend to view
membership differently than Christian churches. Buddhism does not require membership
with a church, and Islam doesn’t view membership at a single Mosque as exclusive in the
way that the Catholic church and many protestant and other Christian churches do. It
would be helpful to do a more in depth study of a more diverse set of faiths, but it’s not
within the scope of this paper. A list of the churches used in my sample is shown in Table
11.
8The 2010 ARDA U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2010 (County
File) has the following note on how adherents are defined: “TOTAL ADHERENTS: all members, includ-
ing full members, their children and the estimated number of other participants who are not considered
members; for example, the baptized, those not confirmed, those not eligible for Communion, those regularly
attending services, and the like. Of the 236 reporting groups, 49 reported members and adherents; 37 re-
ported adherents only; 63 reported members only; four suggested a method for estimating adherents without
reporting members; and 83 reported only congregation locations. Of the 63 that reported members only,
four suggested their own adherent estimating processes, which we used to calculate adherents for them. For
those 59 groups that reported members but did not report adherents nor suggest a method for computing
them, we estimated total adherents for each county by dividing membership by the population at least 14
years of age and then applied this percentage to the Census 2010 100-percent count for the county. There
are 31 counties or equivalents for which the number of reported adherents exceeds the total population in
2010. Reasons for the discrepancy will differ from county to county, but the most plausible would include
U.S. Census undercount, church membership overcount, and county of residence differing from county of
congregational membership. This is especially likely in Virginia, where many cities have been separated
from their adjoining counties.” Similar notes are posted for the 1990 and 2000 data sets as well
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Table 11: Summary Statistics for the ARDA Data
Church
Average
Membership
Std.
Dev.
Average Change
in Membership
Share (% pts)
St.
Dev.
Catholic Church 147,550 364,082 0.74 9.24
The Church of Jesus Christ of LDS 11,041 24,789 0.24 1.00
Southern Baptist Convention 10,345 19,895 -0.50 1.53
United Methodist Church 5,519 7,710 -0.33 0.56
Assemblies of God 5,457 10,411 -0.05 0.60
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 3,615 6,135 -0.21 0.34
Presbyterian Church 3,577 6,067 -0.23 0.22
The Episcopal Church 3,146 5,206 -0.18 0.23
American Baptist Churches 2,884 7927 -0.11 0.28
Seventh-day Adventists 2,852 5,845 -0.03 0.21
The Lutheran Church 2,041 4,035 -0.10 0.17
Churches of Christ 1,719 3,993 -0.12 0.28
Christian Churches 1,588 4,050 -0.04 0.25
Church of the Nazarene 1,402 2,459 -0.02 0.25
United Church of Christ 874 1,684 -0.05 0.10
Disciples of Christ 472 1,177 -0.03 0.10
Church of God 302 746 0.00 0.17
Total Membership 204,386 438,190 -1.04 9.30
Catholic membership dominates the sample, but varies substantially from county to county.
The remaining sample comprises baptists, methodists, protestants, seventh-day adventists
and latter-day saints. On the whole, church membership between 2000 and 2010 fell by
an average of 1 percentage point per county. In fact, every church in the sample showed
declining membership apart from the Catholic Church and the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints, which increased membership by 0.74 and 0.24 percentage points, respec-
tively. Figure 8 shows the sample distribution of membership growth across counties for
the 126 counties in the sample. There is significant variation around the mean, but most
counties are within ±20 percentage points of growth.
The religion data are merged with the housing and loan data by county. In Figure 9, I
estimate and plot a spline on the LTV ratios in counties with positive membership growth
versus counties with negative membership growth to illustrate the general trend in the
data and persistent difference between counties growing and counties declining in church
membership.
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Figure 8: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Church Membership Growth Between
2000 to 2010
0
10
20
30
40
Sh
ar
e
-.2 0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Growth in Church Membership by County between 2000 and 2010
Because the religion data are only available for the years 2000 and 2010, I aggregate the
housing data near those years. Recall that the housing data cover 1997–2009. I average
the years between 1997 and 1999 and associate those years with the 2000 religion data, and
then I average the years between 2007 and 2009 and associate those years with the 2010
religion data. The two-period nature of the religion data restricts the estimation strategy
considerably, as I discuss in the next section. For some robustness checks and alternative
estimations, I use slightly different aggregations on a few select results tables shown in the
appendix.
2.4. Empirical Strategy
Let i index counties, s index states, and t ∈ (0, 1) index the two time periods in the data.
yit is a measure of some outcome of interest in county i and period t. My primary outcome
of interest is the average county loan-to-value ratio, but I look at loan-to-income ratios as
well.
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Figure 9: Trend in LTV Ratios in Counties of Growing and Declining Church Membership
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Given that the data are limited to two distinct periods and that I’m primarily interested in
testing for a significant directional effect, I construct a dummy variable Ti, which is equal
to 1 if a county i has strictly positive membership growth between 2000 and 2010, and 0
otherwise. I modify this definition somewhat later on, but this definition is the basis for
the key results of the paper.
Note that conditional on controlling for factors affecting membership growth that are cor-
related with borrowing behavior, Ti is effectively an indicator for treatment and control,
where treatment is defined as being in a county with growing church membership. I’ll argue
that it is plausible that religious membership growth is essentially exogenous, but it is very
likely that there are contributing factors that I can’t control for here that may bias the
results. Because of the limited scope with which I can control for potentially important
factors, it’s a stretch to call Ti a true “treatment” indicator, but it helps to understand that
this is effectively how it operates.
49
I estimate the following:
yit = β11{t = 1}+ β2Ti + β3Ti1{t = 1}+ x′itγ + αs + εit (2.1)
where xit is a vector of covariates, αs is a state effect, and εit is a random shock. The
estimated coefficient β̂3 is the difference-in-differences estimator.
The difference-in-differences estimator provides an unbiased estimate of the relative effect of
treatment against control, on the condition that assignment to the treatment group doesn’t
covary with some omitted variable that also correlates with the outcome of interest yit. The
challenge is to establish plausible exogeneity in the treatment.
In the case of religious membership growth, I’ll argue for plausible exogeneity, but I won’t
claim it outright. The objective with this paper is primarily to establish a link between
religion and borrowing behavior, which hasn’t been looked at in this detail in the literature.
More precise micro-level data will hopefully provide a cleaner answer to this question in
future research. But with the limitations on data, I can get only so close to estimating a
causal effect.
My basic argument is twofold. First, I control for observable economic and socio-economic
determinants of borrowing that may also influence church membership and attendance.
Glaeser and Saks (2006) find that religion and education are correlated, which I’m not able
to directly account for, but I am able to account for income and race, which are strongly
correlated with educational outcomes. I also control for FHA loans, mean home prices,
and fixed rate loans. To the extent that religious people are more likely to gravitate to
higher or lower income neighborhoods, or neighborhoods with lower or higher overall home
values, or neighborhoods of a particular racial make-up, I control for those effects. Omitting
education, age, sex, marital status, and other socio-economic variables may limit the extent
to which I can isolate the causal effect of religion alone, but I control for these factors to
the extent that I can. Second, I control for state fixed effects. To the extent that omitted
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Figure 10: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Mean Income in Counties of Growing
and Declining Church Membership
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variables are constant over time across counties within a state, I’m able to control for those
effects.
In Figures 10 through 13, I plot the sample distributions for mean income, racial makeup,
population and share of fixed-interest loans by growing and declining church membership
to compare the two groups across a set of observable factors other than loan-to-value ratios.
None of these presents a particular concern regarding the variability of membership in
relation to these economic fundamentals. I incorporate each of these into the final regression
results, and there it’s clear that while they do collectively account for part of the variation
in membership growth, it’s not enough to negate the substantive effect.
2.5. Results
The main results for the paper are shown in Tables 12 and 13. I compare LTV ratios
and LTI ratios between counties with growing church membership and declining church
membership over the 10 year period between 2000 and 2010. I’ve aggregated the LTV and
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Figure 11: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Shares of Borrowers Who Are Black in
Counties of Growing and Declining Church Membership
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Figure 12: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Population in Counties of Growing and
Declining Church Membership
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Figure 13: Empirical Distribution of County-Level Share of Fixed-Interest Mortgages in
Counties of Growing and Declining Church Membership
0
5
10
15
20
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
Declining Growing
Sh
ar
e
% Fixed Interest Rate Loans
Graphs by treat
LTI data for years 1997–1999 and 2007–2009 and estimated the change over the period for
growing church membership counties and declining church membership counties. In effect,
I estimate a difference-in-differences estimator with a “treatment” of church membership
growth.
Post × Treatment provides the coefficient of interest. In Table 12, the coefficients for each
specification are significant at the 5% level and all of them are negative, indicating that
growth counties have lower average loan-to-value ratios than declining counties. Further-
more, the results are robust to the set of controls, including population controls (which are
population dummies indicating levels of population) and state fixed effects, implying that
at the very least these factors are not driving the results.
Sans random assignment, it perhaps would be going one step too far to infer a causal
relationship, and because I am working with aggregate values, I am not able to control
for a variety of factors that might affect results on a micro level, but these results are
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Table 12: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Value Ratios
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment -0.032∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Post 0.051∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Treatment 0.026∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.012∗ 0.010
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.086∗∗∗ -0.086∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗
(0.018) (0.019) (0.032)
% FHA Loans 0.404∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.041)
log(Mean Home Price) -0.044∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.016) (0.019)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) 0.035∗ 0.036∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
log(Mean County Income) 0.016 0.011 0.032
(0.015) (0.017) (0.020)
% Black 0.079 0.089 0.074
(0.062) (0.071) (0.076)
% Church Adherents -0.045∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.027
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.141 0.661 0.664 0.723
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-value ratio. N = 284.
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Table 13: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Income Ratios
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment -0.048 0.021 0.018 -0.013
(0.113) (0.033) (0.032) (0.030)
Post 0.791∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031)
Treatment 0.152∗ 0.006 0.014 0.012
(0.081) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.219∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.139
(0.080) (0.074) (0.098)
% FHA Loans 1.092∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗
(0.082) (0.094) (0.108)
log(Mean Home Price) 1.775∗∗∗ 1.756∗∗∗ 1.592∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.070)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) -1.439∗∗∗ -1.470∗∗∗ -1.352∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
log(Mean County Income) -0.253∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.061) (0.061)
% Black 0.135 -0.075 0.416
(0.275) (0.305) (0.297)
% Church Adherents -0.413∗∗∗ -0.419∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗
(0.067) (0.069) (0.084)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.451 0.957 0.960 0.966
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-value ratio. N = 284.
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suggestive nonetheless. They imply that growth counties have loan-to-value ratios that are
approximately .0192 lower than declining counties. The mean LTV ratio for counties in the
2007–2009 period is .846. The effect is modest, but certainly economically meaningful. And
that we see any effect in the aggregate is noteworthy.
The coefficient for Post × Treatment in Table 13 is insignificant under every specification.
This is not particularly surprising. Ferreira and Gyourko (2015) find that income was
not predictive of foreclosure in the housing crisis, while loan-to-value ratios in excess of
1 where highly predictive. This suggests that the loan-to-value ratio is more closely tied
to risk than the loan-to-income ratio. And this is somewhat intuitive for two reasons.
First, loan-to-income ratios are effectively constrained by banks’ underwriting standards.
While not all banks observed strict standards prior to the 2008 crisis, and over-reporting
of income was more common, the data can only reflect reported levels, and so even where
borrowers were willing to take on excessive risk in the form of high LTI ratios, the reported
ratios were likely to look relatively normal. That’s in contrast to LTV ratios, which don’t
depend on self-reported values, but rather on market pricing, a bank’s appraisal, and the
final loan amount. And lending standards consistently allowed for loan-to-value ratios that
approached 1, putting borrowers at a much higher risk of seeing the value of their homes
fall below their outstanding mortgages.
The second reason that loan-to-income ratios are less meaningful as a measure of risk
appetite is that income isn’t a direct measure of liquid assets, and in the case of home-
ownership, liquid assets are more important than pure income. A borrower with a high
loan-to-income ratio but substantial liquid assets is not equal to a borrower with the same
loan-to-income ratio but fewer liquid assets. The correct risk measure would include both
income and other assets to account for the true ability to repay. We don’t get that with
loan-to-income ratios alone. On the other hand, loan-to-value ratios are more likely to
reflect a borrower’s full ability to repay a loan. A high loan-to-value ratio is typically only
necessary if the borrower lacks sufficient liquid assets to afford a higher down payment.
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Table 14: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Value Ratios (Modified Control
Group)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment -0.050∗∗ -0.011 -0.012 -0.008
(0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Post 0.066 0.050 0.054 0.051
(0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
Treatment 0.026∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.097∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.077
(0.029) (0.030) (0.065)
% FHA Loans 0.421∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.045) (0.060)
log(Mean Home Price) -0.056∗∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.082∗
(0.024) (0.030) (0.042)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) 0.041 0.044 0.069
(0.027) (0.035) (0.045)
log(Mean County Income) 0.033 0.031 0.057∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.031)
% Black 0.047 0.033 0.049
(0.071) (0.095) (0.144)
% Church Adherents -0.083∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗ -0.074∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.032)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.152 0.727 0.730 0.784
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-value ratio. N = 110. The control group is modified to include
counties in which the change in church membership is within 1 percentage point, i.e., effectively static.
It’s precisely that lack of liquidity that makes the decision to borrow at a high LTV much
riskier than borrowing at a moderate LTV.
For those reasons, I’m not particularly surprised that the estimates in Table 13 are insignifi-
cant. Loan-to-income ratios are less likely to provide a clear indication of high risk appetite
than loan-to-value ratios. It isn’t that loan-to-income ratios are necessarily unaffected by
religious affiliation in general, but the measure itself is subject to too much noise to allow
for the clean identification of an effect.
Tables 14 and 15 show the results for the same regressions, but with a slightly modified
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Table 15: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Income Ratios (Modified Control
Group)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment 0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.036
(0.173) (0.046) (0.046) (0.043)
Post 0.753∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.046) (0.051) (0.056)
Treatment 0.119 0.032 0.043 0.046
(0.129) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.203 -0.249 -0.104
(0.173) (0.175) (0.188)
% FHA Loans 1.159∗∗∗ 1.029∗∗∗ 0.836∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.140) (0.165)
log(Mean Home Price) 1.708∗∗∗ 1.638∗∗∗ 1.532∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.109) (0.137)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) -1.345∗∗∗ -1.335∗∗∗ -1.261∗∗∗
(0.101) (0.128) (0.157)
log(Mean County Income) -0.290∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.136
(0.091) (0.092) (0.100)
% Black 0.257 -0.078 0.166
(0.413) (0.454) (0.517)
% Church Adherents -0.447∗∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.195
(0.088) (0.092) (0.142)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.433 0.966 0.968 0.973
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-value ratio. N = 110. The control group is modified to include
counties in which the change in church membership is within 1 percentage point, i.e., effectively static.
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control group. In this case, rather than Ti = 0 indicating a county with declining church
membership, it indicates a county with membership grouth between −.01 and .01. In other
words, effectively static membership levels. And Ti = 1 indicates growth in excess of .01.
The modified approach limits the sample size, but allows us to check that the directionality
of the effect as measured in the previous regressions isn’t sensitive to the definition of the
treatment and control groups, per se.
Table 14 shows an insignificant effect, but a negative estimate nonetheless. The attenuation
in magnitude suggests that the differences between growth counties and non-growth counties
are more likely to be due to the greater differences in religious makeup, and that the results
aren’t highly sensitive to the composition of the control group except in the predictable
sense that a tighter condition on the control group yields an attenuated effect.
The estimate in Table 15 remains insignificant, as we should expect.
As I mentioned previously, one interesting result from these tables is the insignificant esti-
mates on the variable % black. This is especially interesting because while the argument for
religion’s association with borrowing behavior is essentially one about values, culture, and
social norms, we might make a similar argument for racial composition in a county, which
tends to be associated with values, culture, and social norms. But here we see that race
seems to play no role after controlling for the other factors. Again, we don’t necessarily
expect borrowing behavior to be impacted by race, but it’s not obvious that religion should
play any significant role either, and yet there we seem to have an effect.
2.6. Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to be descriptive and informative in regards to how religious
affiliation generally relates to borrowing behavior. The subject seems especially important
in light of the recent credit crisis which left many highly leveraged home owners with
the unexpected burden of a home in negative equity and/or a dwindling income. It is
therefore pertinent to revisit the behavioral nature of borrowing, and push the literature
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into unexplored territory. While religion has been studied extensively as a factor and a
determinant of social behavior and intellectual achievement, little has been done to study
its effect on financial behavior such as borrowing.
I have employed a difference-in-differences framework to test for the effects of religious
growth/decline using aggregated county-level data. I control for a variety of aggregate
factors which might influence sorting on fundamentals and/or religious affiliation, and I
find evidence in favor of a negative effect on loan-to-value ratios and no effect on loan-
to-income ratios. The model remains susceptible to omitted variable bias, and does not
account for micro level factors that influence movement and home purchasing decisions,
but as a descriptive model, it does rather well, showing that there exists an economically
significant differential between counties with high religious growth and those with declining
religious populations.
Additional research in this area is warranted. Religious organizations make up some of
the largest social and cultural communities in the U.S., and while membership is declining,
America remains relatively religious among its peers in the developed world. Understanding
the effects of religion on economic and social behavior is important to inform social policy
in terms of public education and financial awareness.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Corruption Data
The data on corruption used in Chapter 1 comes from an expansive record of federal cor-
ruption cases maintained by the Transaction Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC). These
data are obtained largely through Freedom of Information Act requests. TRAC maintains
datasets covering criminal cases, civil cases, government administration, the judicial sys-
tem,and federal funding in the United States. TRAC grants individuals access to the raw
data files under the TRAC Fellows program, which is available, upon request, to researchers
affiliated with institutions that already subscribe to other TRAC services. In other words,
these data aren’t free and publicly available, but they are not otherwise restricted.
This section describes the key variables in the data, some issues with consistency and
reliability, and the methods used in this paper to clean and reduce the dataset to a workable
subset for the specific purposes of this research.
The data, as of this writing, are divided into three extracts. The first covers fiscal years 1986
through 1991, the second covers fiscal years 1992 through 2003, and the last covers 2004
through the present.9 There are important differences between the three extracts. The first
extract has fewer variables overall. In particular, it excludes the sentencing data available
in the more recent extracts. The post-2003 extract differs in that it excludes cases where
a decision hasn’t been made about whether to prosecute or not.10 There are also some
differences between each extract in the coding of certain variables, but none that matters
for this paper. In general, the extracts are consistent enough that they can be merged and
aggregated as a single consistent record, which is what I’ve done.
Below I outline the primary variables in the TRAC data. I also make note of specific
adjustments made to those variables and to the sample. This list is not exhaustive, but
9The data used in this paper were current as of 2014, i.e., records are available through fiscal year 2013.
10TRAC has been working to make these data on referrals available through litigation.
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covers the key components of the data to help clarify its structure.
DOJ CATEGORY The Department of Justice categorizes cases by type. For
instance, public corruption cases fall under seven categories.
These are
011 Federal Corruption - Procurement
012 Federal Corruption - Program
013 Federal Corruption - Law Enforcement
014 Federal Corruption - Other
015 State Corruption
016 Local Corruption
01Z Other Public Corruption
The categories are in reference to the level of government at
which the corruption occurred. In aggregating the data, I
look specifically at overall corruption (includes all of the
above categories), as well as overall federal, state, and local
corruption, where federal corruption includes categories 011
through 014.
LEAD CHARGE This variable identifies the lead charge in each case. For
example, a lead charge might reference Chapter 18 Section
201 of the U.S. Code, which covers “Bribery, Graft, and
Conflicts of Interest.” I omit lead charges that are likely to
be associated with lower level government employees,
including mail fraud.11 For a list of charges included in the
data, see Table 17.
11While gathering corruption data, I submitted a FOIA request to the DOJ to see surveys that the DOJ
gives to attorneys general on the types of investigations they conduct. Those surveys showed a surprising
number of corruption cases involving postal workers. While these surveys can only serve as anecdotal
evidence, they suggest that most corruption may involve criminal activity that we don’t typically think of
as government corruption. I’m primarily interested in more serious crimes, so for that reason, I exclude mail
fraud from the corruption case data.
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REFERRING
AGENCY
Cases originate outside of the DOJ. Typically, cases are
referred by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (by far the
most common source of referrals), but cases may come from
virtually any branch of government. Another common source
is the Internal Revenue Service.
STATE Every district in the U.S. is represented, but I aggregate at
the state level to conform with the newspaper data from
Editor & Publisher.
REFERRAL DATE,
FILING DATE,
DISPOSITION
DATE
Each case records a specific date that the case was referred to
the DOJ, as well as the date that a case was filed for
prosecution and ultimately disposed of. Disposal occurs
when the case is concluded, which may or may not include a
trial or verdict of guilt. Cases are often declined, in which
case the attorney general declines to pursue any action. This
happens in nearly 48% of the cases in the sample. About
29% of cases ultimately result in a guilty verdict.
DISPOSITION
TYPE
The type of disposition is typically recorded along with the
disposition date. As noted above, these are typically coded
as declinations or verdicts of guilt. It is rare to see a case go
to trial that results in a not-guilty verdict. It is slightly more
common for cases to be dismissed at trial, but even this is a
relatively rare outcome. There are other potential outcomes,
but they occur with such low frequency, that they matter
little to the aggregated data at all.
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SENTENCING There are several variables available in the two of the three
extracts that provide some information about sentencing in
cases. These include the sentencing date, prison time,
probation time, and fines. It’s unclear how accurate these
data are. In particular, it’s not clear that these sentences are
representative of the actual sentences carried out, as the U.S.
legal system allows for some leniency in actual sentences
relative to prescribed sentences.
In addition to the adjustments already outlined, I make two minor adjustments for consistency—
I exclude cases that lack a referral date and drop cases that show a referral date after a
filing or disposition date.
The most significant adjustment I make to the data is in excluding lead charges other than
those shown in Table 17, although I still cast a fairly wide net. The exclusion of cases based
on the lead charges is almost entirely a matter of excluding mail fraud and related charges
so as to avoid including postal workers in the final tally of corruption convictions for public
officials.
To avoid any issues related to the change in record-keeping after 2003, I include only cases
that have been disposed of, and for much of the analysis, focus on convictions specifically,
which I define as cases with a disposition type of “guilty.” As noted previously, after 2003,
the data exclude referrals that have yet to be prosecuted or disposed of, which means that
aggregating referrals after 2003 may fail to account for all of the outstanding referrals,
resulting in an inconsistent series. This is especially problematic the closer one gets to
2013. Including only cases that have been disposed of resolves this problem, although it is
limiting in one respect.
My analysis focuses primarily on convictions, which aggregate consistently at the state-year
level. However, part of the analysis looks at referrals. For these, I aggregate at the state-
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Table 17: Lead Charges on Sample Corruption Cases
Description Title Sections Obs. %
Embezzlement and Theft 18 641–670 8,612 22.48
Bribery, Graft, and Conflicts of Interest 18 201–227 8,050 21.01
Racketeering 18 1951–1960 8,017 20.93
Fraud and False Statements 18 1001–1040 4,362 11.39
Conspiracy 18 371–373 2,703 7.06
Claims and Services in Matters Affecting
Government
18 281–293 1,545 4.03
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 18 1961–1968 943 2.46
Obstruction of Justice 18 1501–1521 864 2.26
Internal Revenue Code 26 537 1.40
Prisons 18 1791–1793 497 1.30
Civil Rights 18 241–249 490 1.28
Public Contracts 41 306 0.80
Perjury 18 1621–1623 260 0.68
Counterfeiting and Forgery 18 470–514 248 0.65
Public Officers and Employees 18 1901–1924 239 0.62
Extortion and Threats 18 871–880 230 0.60
Stolen Property 18 2311–2323 121 0.32
Elections and Political Activities 18 591–617 103 0.27
Money and Finance 31 74 0.19
False Personation 18 911–917 64 0.17
Robbery and Burglary 18 2111–2119 22 0.06
Extortionate Credit Transactions 18 891–896 20 0.05
Charges are listed by their name, title and sections as given in the U.S. Code, and sorted by frequency.
The number of observations and the percentage of observations are provided for reference. These reflect
the observations in the cleaned sample of corruption convictions used for analysis.
65
year level as well, but the year I use is the year in which the referral was made, not the
year in which the case was disposed of, which means that there is likely to be some decay
in the later years of data as referrals aren’t fully reflected in the data and many may still
have months or years before they will be disposed of. This problem is partially addressed
by the fact that my other data only goes through 2009, effectively trimming the end of the
data by 4 years. The average number of days between referral and disposition is 550, with
a standard deviation of nearly 600. The 90th percentile is 1322 days, meaning that we can
with some confidence expect that in 2009, we have at least 90% of referrals recorded. In
combination with year fixed effects, I think the impact of this particular abnormality in the
data is likely to be negligible.
A.2. Supplementary Regression Results
The following tables are supplementary to the results in Chapter 2.
Tables 18 and 19 show results where I define the treatment group as counties strictly declin-
ing in religious membership (difference in shares between 2010 and 2000 is less than -.01).
The control group is identical to the modified control group discussed previously (defined as
essentially no change in membership). The results in both tables are largely insignificant,
which is consistent with tables 14 and 15. There is some evidence of significance for the
effect on loan-to-income ratios in 19, but the effect in column M4 is the best measure here,
and it is insignificant.
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Table 18: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Value Ratios (Modified Control
and Treatment Groups)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment -0.022 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003
(0.020) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Post 0.066∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Treatment 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.006
(0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.091∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.087∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.043)
% FHA Loans 0.410∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗ 0.416∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.038) (0.048)
log(Mean Home Price) -0.047∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.067∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.021) (0.025)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) 0.050 0.050 0.062∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.033)
log(Mean County Income) 0.009 0.008 0.026∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
% Black 0.091 0.109 0.111
(0.068) (0.073) (0.078)
% Church Adherents -0.038∗ -0.036 -0.004
(0.023) (0.024) (0.036)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.156 0.659 0.662 0.713
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-value ratio. N = 226. The control group is modified to include
counties in which the change in church membership is within 1 percentage point, i.e., effectively static, and
the treatment group includes only counties with church membership declining by more than 1 percentage
point.
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Table 19: Difference-in-Differences Estimates on Loan-to-Income Ratios (Modified Control
and Treatment Groups)
M1 M2 M3 M4
Post × Treatment 0.037 -0.068∗ -0.072∗ -0.050
(0.145) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037)
Post 0.753∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.038) (0.039) (0.044)
Treatment -0.014 0.032 0.034 0.034
(0.111) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
% Fixed-Rate Loans -0.244∗∗ -0.225∗∗ -0.178
(0.094) (0.089) (0.133)
% FHA Loans 1.087∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.106) (0.125)
log(Mean Home Price) 1.793∗∗∗ 1.763∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.093) (0.098)
log(Mean Income of Borrowers) -1.459∗∗∗ -1.454∗∗∗ -1.277∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.120) (0.130)
log(Mean County Income) -0.238∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗
(0.069) (0.074) (0.076)
% Black 0.130 -0.015 0.451
(0.308) (0.324) (0.313)
% Church Adherents -0.404∗∗∗ -0.425∗∗∗ -0.196∗
(0.084) (0.089) (0.114)
Population Level Controls YES YES
State Fixed Effects YES
R-Squared 0.444 0.956 0.958 0.963
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The regressor in each of these
regressions is the county mean loan-to-income ratio. N = 226. The control group is modified to include
counties in which the change in church membership is within 1 percentage point, i.e., effectively static, and
the treatment group includes only counties with church membership declining by more than 1 percentage
point.
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